Governing Green Finance

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Outline

* Focus is on financing arrangements to promote the environmental and ethical quality of our society

- Background
- Case
- Governance
- Conclusion


Background


- Finance and the Economy
 - Banks and other intermediaries screen and select alternative investment projects. They incur a fraction $1-\phi$ in this process.
 - Information production and diversification opportunities by financial intermediaries improve marginal social productivity of capital.
 - Intermediaries affect the savings rate.


Background

- Financial intermediaries are perfectly equipped to assess investment projects.
- Selection process green finance:
 - Negative selection: do not consider lending to or investing in projects with particular attributes, such as tobacco, gambling, weapons, nuclear.
 - Positive selection: do consider firms with particular attributes; pick the best in class w.r.t. their performance on different characteristics (problem: how to weigh the attributes, ranks)

- Government tax incentive instrument.
- In use since 1995 to promote environmentally friendly initiatives and to raise consumer awareness.
- Private households lend money to Green Banks at a lower interest rate, which is compensated by a tax subsidy.
- Green Banks offer cheaper loans to governmentcertified environmental projects.
- Examples: organic farming, renewable energy, sustainable residential construction.









- Economic: employment, value added; part of the projects would have been undertaken anyhow.
- Tax: less income & dividend taxes, more VAT, corporate taxes.
- Financial system: concentration implies vulnerability.
- Environment: complementary activities, hardly substitutes. Average production 'cleaner' but overall burden on the environment still increases.

Emissions Prevented by Green Projects 2003



Governance: Stakeholders



Governance: Stakeholders

- 1. Firms (realize projects, return, positioning)
- 2. Intermediaries (generate turnover, return, positioning)
- 3. Government:
 - Financial supervisor (prudential intermediary behavior)
 - Treasury (tax income)
 - Other ministries (employment, environment, projects)
 - Certifying institutions (quality, employment)
 - Local authorities (employment)
- 4. NGO's (positioning, labor conditions, environment)
- 5. Consumer households (return, environment)

Governance: Problems

- Conflicts of interest. Esp. within government institutions (conflicting + hidden agendas). Mixing means with ends.
- Costs. Hidden and/or shifted.
- Trade-off mechanism. Not transparent as environmental goals are not made explicit and are not stated in operation terms.

RESULT: **suboptimal use** of the financial funds and the efforts, i.e. waste of resources.

Conclusion

- 1. Dutch Green Project Facility appears to be a success (many projects, much invested) but environmental goals are not defined.
- 2. Conflicts of interest because of unfocused public governance, hampers correct market ordening.
- 3. Opaque goals result in waste of financial resources and of human effort.
- 4. Results could improve when clear goals are set and when the key roles and the comparative advantages of the agents are acknowledged and respected.

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